












Title: A flight before light : some remarks on Levinas' phenomenology of Eros 
 
 
Author: Ewa Borkowska 
 
Citation style: Borkowska Ewa. (1996). A flight before light : some remarks 
on Levinas' phenomenology of Eros. W: T. Rachwał, T. Sławek (red.). 
"Representations of the erotic" (S. 102-107). Katowice :Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego 
Ewa Borkowska
A Flight Before Light: Some Remarks on 
Levinas’ Phenomenology of Eros
V irtue’s no more in womankind 
But the green sickness o f the mond 
Philosphy, their new delight . . .
J. C leveland , The A n iip la to n ic
The feminine is not what opposes the masculine but what seduces it. The secret 
o f its strength is that it is always somewhere else, never where it thinks it is, not 
in the history imputed to it but in seduction. Jean Baudrillard regards the “sov­
ereignty o f seduction as mastery of symbolic universe” and not as political or sexual 
power.1 Seduction, though, has no power o f  its own or at least it seems not to have 
one; it only annuls the power o f production. The theatricality, rhetoricity and sterility 
o f seduction, however, seem to stand in opposition to the fertility (fecundity) of 
the feminine and its clandestinity. The feminine is what throws itself into the light 
(appearance) without becoming signification2, the not yet, unreality at the thresold 
o f the real, clandestinity that “exhausts essence o f this non-essence”.'
Levinas, whose philosophy will be considered here as a phenomenological 
underpinning o f the poetics o f the feminine regards the female as an embodiment 
o f the absolutely other. The feminine is not only one party in the fusion that binds 
the male and the female but an individual in the duality o f beings. Thus conceived 
a relationship respects the alterity and preserves it despite the fact that the other 
remains constantly ungraspable, keeps slipping away, withdraws into its mystery. 
The transcendence as withdrawing and hiding as modesty are the inverse move­
ments that characterize the phenomenology o f Eros, that is a communication in 
eros. A “reversal o f movement” lies at the bottom o f a distinction between Greek 
and Christian love, the former always regarded as an aspiration o f the lower towards
1 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction  (N ew  York: St. M artin ’s Press, 1990), p. 8.
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity  (The Hague: Martinus N ijhoff Publishers, 1979), p. 250.
3 Ibid., p. 257.
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the higher whereas the latter the reverse, the stooping o f the rich and the nobler 
to the poor and the common. In Levinas’ philosophy love is considered as the 
veneration o f the otherness with the alterity o f the other person, however, diffe­
rent from submission and enslavement. Levinas does not conceal the fact that in 
his view the model o f otherness is reminiscent o f  the medieval chivalric code with 
a great respect for the female dignity which bears here a cryptic name o f the 
“voluptuous clandestinity’’.
The uniqueness of the relationship with alterity lies in the fact that it is a very 
particular kind o f voluptuous pleasure, unlike any other fusion. The caress here 
is a mode which allows one to transcend contact as sensation since it is not confined 
to the touching hand, its warmth and softness; on the contrary, its essence is that 
it is not aware o f what it seeks. Levinas explains that the tender that caress aims 
at designates a way, the one between being and not-yet-being, not signifying but 
frail in its vulnerability and morality. The caress alway looks forward and opens 
up new perspectives onto the unknown and the ungraspable, its aim never grasp­
ing, possessing and knowing, the latter the synonyms and symptoms o f power. 
J. Ruskin is not the first one to notice that men and women are assigned different 
modes o f activity as is proclaimed in his essay O f Q ueen’s Gardens', in an 
old-fashioned and slightly baroque manner he describes the major difference 
between the two powers:
The m an’s power is active, progressive, defensive. He is em inently the doer, the creator, 
the discoverer. His intellect is for speculation and invention, his energy for adventure, for 
war and for conquest. . . But the w om an’s power is not for rule, not for battle -  and her 
in tellect is not for invention or creation, but for sw eet ordering, arrangem ent and 
decision. . .H er great function is praise.4
The Ruskinian ideology o f the feminine remains, though, at loggerheads with the 
phenomenology o f Eros according to which each party remains complete and not 
completing each other in the union since the “pathos o f love consists in an insur­
mountable duality of beings” /  The status of man and woman is not, in Levinas’ view, 
reducible to a difference in a genus but that o f fraternity which has two aspects:
it involves individualities whose. . .singularity consists in each referring to itself. . . .  On 
the other hand, it involves the commonness o f  a father, as though the commonness o f  race 
w'ould not bring together enough/’
According to Levinas love is posited before the fusion and therefore escapes any 
possibility o f the pre-existing whole. The other is not another existent but alterity, 
alien-ation which is its essence, the withdrawing mystery that is opposed to the 
movement o f consciousness.
The communication with the other can be neither projected nor planned since 
it is a game absolutely unpredictable, with something inaccessible, always to come,
4 Lynette Need, M yths o f  Sexuality  (Basil B lackwell, 1988), p. 34. 
’ Sean Hand, The Levinas Reader (Blackwell, 1989), p. 49.
E. Levinas, Totality and  Infinity, p. 214.
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always other, the relationship with the future, with what is never there. Only such 
a relationship allows for the triumph and survival o f the I, the situation described 
as the victory over death, the secret forced by the caress that does not grasp the 
possibles. In Levinas’ words:
An am orphous non-I sweeps away the I into an absolute future when it escapes itself and 
loses its position as a subject. Its “ intention” no longer goes forth unto the light, unto the 
m eaningful.7
Here the meaningful remains always clandestine, does not lose its mystery in the 
disclosed, escapes profanation, goes beyond the expressible. The “death” of the 
subject Levinas refers to implies the birth o f the self, in love and through love, which 
“it itself was ineluctably pre-conditioned to become”,8 as Stephen Dedalus aptly 
notices in his paraphrase of D. Scotus’ theological passage on the divinity of love.
For Levinas love is not a need to be fulfilled but the desire which is free of lack, 
never gratified as its object constantly withdraws, is never grasped. The other is 
accepted en toto as a person, a Thou rather than an it so the other-oriented mode 
o f thinking is not knowing but, rather, an insatiable desire feeding on itself. The re­
lationship with the other is absolute in the sense that the other can always absolve 
himself from this relation with his integrity intact. The situation seems to reflect the 
ideal of the chivalric love and the respect for and the cult of the woman, the ex­
ceptional position o f the feminine in the economy of being. This implies that the 
woman is not the mysterious unknowable but a mode o f being that does not ease 
to slip away from the light. Hopkins expresses well the idea in question when he refers 
to the “nestling, world-mothering air” o f the woman that nurses man everywhere9:
W orldm othering air, air wild,
W ound with thee, in the isled,
Fold home, fast fold thy child.
The same I-Thou relationship is articulated elsewhere in Hopkins as the moment 
o f encounter that extends beyond the boundaries o f self and enhances the very 
essence o f self (cf. “self steeped and pashed”).
The relation thus posited is inconceivable without the Thou which is not within 
the sphere o f thought but remains as the indeterminate horizon o f  the encounter. 
Only in such a meeting one being confronts another in the intersubjective rela­
tionship in which the I truly affirms itself, its affirmation impossible without the 
presence o f the Thou. This moment o f the phenomenology o f Love or the “pathos 
o f love” as Levinas calls it is well described by Hopkins as “laced with the fire 
o f stress”, the metamorphosis caused by “the swoon o f a heart” (Hopkins, The o f  
the Deutschland) which results in a communion considered as the primary act of 
being. In Levinas’ words:
’ Ibid., p. 254.
8 James Joyce, Ulisses (New York: Random  House, 1934), p. 494.
’ Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems, ed. W. H. Gardner and N. Mackenzie (Oxford University Press, 
1970), No. 60.
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Man can becom e whole not by virtue o f  the relation to h im self but only by virtue o f 
a relation to another se lf.1"
This moment o f the final self-affirmation is well described by Hopkins in Spelt 
from  S ib y l’s Leaves', “selfwrung, selfstrung, sheathe- and shelterless, thoughts 
against thoughts in groans grind”. Only the self “steeped and pashed” can dialogue 
with the other since by opening oneself to the other one becomes responsible for 
him that is there “face to face”. The self thus “dismembered, disremembered” does 
not seek the recognition o f the other but a genuine communication (communion) 
with him which is not a limitation o f one’s self but a real participation in the 
dialogue with the ego deprived o f its pride and imperialism characteristic o f it. 
Levinas defines this moment as substitution, self-renunciation as the expulsion of 
self outside o f itself. The substitution o f the ego by the self is possible only through 
the other which in no way signifies a submission to the no-ego but the reverse, 
an openness to and an act o f  sacrifice for the other.
The responsibility for the other becomes obsession, a commitment to the other 
which precludes the return to oneself, not alienation but in-spiration in which the 
self is absolved o f itself. We are reminded o f the fact that we are all responsible 
for the others but, as Alyosha Karamazov holds it, “I am more responsible than 
anyone else.” This moment o f responsibility is labeled as the “responsibility for 
the responsibility o f the other”," one more degree o f responsibility to become 
oneself not as essence but as a sub-jectum that supports the whole o f being. The 
relationship o f such a status, the one between the subject and the other is com­
munication that disregards indication, the semantic monstration as thematization 
and, as such, becomes the trace in which a face is ordered as irreducible to a sign. 
Instead o f verbal communication Levinas’ phenomenology o f Eros proposes the 
epiphany o f Face in which thematization as articulation is considered anarchic and 
destructive for the relation o f the subject with the order.
In the phenomenology o f Eros language is not the expression o f one’s view 
or opinion; it is the “face in which the other -  the absolutely other -  presents him­
se lf ’ and “does not do violence to it [the same] as do opinion or authority or the 
thaumaturgie supernatural” .12 Since the essence o f language is being with the Other 
signification arises in being with language, within the primordial face to face with 
language. In Levinas’ words:
Signification resem bles it [a potency that evinces the act] as an overflow ing o f  the in­
tention  that envisages by the being envisaged. B ut here the inexhaustible surplus o f  
infinity overflow s the actuality  o f  consciousness. The shim m er o f  infinity, the face, can 
no longer be stated in term s o f  consciousness, in m etaphors referring  to light and the 
sensible. It is the ethical exigency o f  the face, w hich puts into question the conscious­
ness that w elcom es it.11
10 E. R. Smith (ed.), Em m anuel Levinas. Between M an a n d  M an (London: Collins, 1961), p. 68.
"  S. Hand, The Levinas R eader , p. 107.
12 E. Levinas, Totality and  Infinity, p. 203.
15 Ibid., p. 207.
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This is the best description o f poetic language, the one which signifies while 
relinguishing signification, undoes the structure o f language, goes beyond the codes 
and systems. The surplus, the excess Levinas refers to, is that which opens man 
to the Other before saying anything, the “hyperbolic passivity o f  giving prior to 
all willing and thematization” .14
The excess o f language the poet experiences as saying (prior to speaking) is 
related to the “vigilance o f insomnia”, the always active presence o f the other who 
breaks the rest o f the same, interferes when equality tends to threaten with wake­
fulness falling to sleep. Insomnia as wakefulness exceeds the limits o f intention- 
ality as irreducible to the affirmation o f the same and inclines towards the Other 
in the indeterminated, disinterested, immaterial way. This cry o f “ethical revolt” 
is a recognition o f the infinite obligation to the Other which overcomes intention- 
ality and reveals the good that reigns beyond being. Levinas’ “eternal vigilance”, 
a waking dream, the wakefulness and insomnia, structure his ethics of the infinity 
and alterity, characterize existence not as the temporalizing movement but the one 
which is “an absolutely unavoidable presence”,1' the “incessance o f presence” 
(infinity).
Phenomenology o f Eros is supported by the philosophy o f insomnia, eternal 
wakefulness which occurs in a nocturnal space as opposed to the diurnal light 
o f thematization. It is in such a space that our security is threatened since si­
lence, tranquillity and void o f sensations to which one is exposed construct an 
absolutely indeterminate menace. The “horror o f darkness” is not, however, an 
anxiety about or a danger o f death but the fear o f being different from Heideg- 
gerian fear o f  nothingness. Levinas’ argument harkens back to the third Carte­
sian meditation which indicates that before the notion o f oneself man possesses 
the sense o f the infinity in him, the orientation towards the Other that overturns 
consciousness, the presence to self which is the end o f the monadology o f the 
“I think” .
Phenomenology o f Eros is the philosophy o f alertness, patience and waiting 
for that which is to come and which still remains ungraspable, clandestine, the 
hidden that will never become a signification. The equivocation o f such a situ­
ation, its metaphoricity is well described in Levinas’ essay:
The secret appears w ithout appearing, not because it would appear half-way, or with 
reservation, or in confusion. The sim ultaneity o f  the clandestine and the exposed precisely 
defines profanation. It appears in equivocation. But it is profanation that permits equiv­
ocation -  essentially erotic -  not the reverse. . . .The sim ultaneity o f the equivocation o f 
this fragility and this weight o f  non-signifyingness, heavier than the weight o f the form­
less real, we shall term fem in in ity .'1'
The feminine is the vertiginous depth o f what is not yet, of what remains between 
being and not-yet-being, the frailty o f the Beloved, the equivocal which “plays
14 S. Hand, The Levinas R eader , p. 183.
15 Ibid., p. 30.
16 E. Levinas, Totality and  Infinity, p. 257.
A Flight Before Light. 107
between speech and the renouncement o f sppech”,17 the non-signifyingness o f the 
face prior to “any finite thought and every thought o f the finite”.18 The expression 
o f the face, the relevation, is such that it provokes resistance, recalcitrance not in 
a negative sense o f forcing violence or struggle but in the positive sense o f gen­
erating a response to his welcome. This is the ethical attitude which arises from the 
presence o f the infinite in the human and goes beyond intentionality. The concern 
o f the Infinite with man via his [man’s] relationship with another man in the mystery 
o f encounter is the kernel o f the phenomenology o f Eros. In Levinas words:
The Infinite is not indifferent to me. It is in calling me to other men that transcendence 
concerns me. In this unique intrigue o f  transcendence, the non-absence o f  the Infinite is 
neither presence, nor representation. Instead, the idea o f  the Infinite is to be found in my 
responsibility for the O ther.1
According to Levinas love can be enacted only through the Infinite since then 
it is free o f  any teleological bias, different from the absorption in immanence and 
constitutive o f alterity. For Levinas love is a mode o f infinitizing rather than to­
talizing since the latter is synonymous with power, possessing and knowing. In 
love the proximity o f the Other implies an absolute remoteness and pathos of 
distance and duality. The absence of the Other, never grasped and possessed aspires 
to the mystery o f love which is the face-to-face without intermediacy, the love 
as awakening, a responsibility for another and a subjection to the Other. It is not 
the love without eros but one in which Eros is o f  phenomenological validity.
17 Ibid., p. 260.
18 Ibid., p. 197.
19 Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy in France Today (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 112.
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Lot przed światłem : kilka uwag na tem at fenom enologii erosu u Em anuela Levinasa
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Artykuł jes t fenomenologicznym  ujęciem problem atyki relacji z Innym, który nie jest przedm io­
tem pożądania (zaspokojenia potrzeby), lecz celem  pragnienia m etafizycznego „wolnego od braku”, 
pragnienia, które zostaje zaspokojone w nieskończoności. Inny pobudza moje zatroskanie i odpowie­
dzialność, nie jes t częścią  mnie, lecz indyw idualnością całościow ą i jednostkow ą. M iędzy m ną 
a Innym istnieje różnica i nieskończona odległość, której nie sposób przekroczyć, ująć w pojęcia czy 
uchwycić intuicją. M ożna jej tylko pragnąć. Pragnienie Innego jest pragnieniem nieskończoności, które 
ujaw nia się w m omencie spotkania z Innym, a zatem  jes t to dośw iadczenie w sferze etycznej (Le­
vinas), która wyprzedza dośw iadczenie ontologiczne (Heidegger); pragnienie nieskończoności jaw i 
się bowiem  jako  bardziej źródłow e niż jakiekolw iek m yślenie rozum ujące. Relacja z Innym to akt 
bezinteresownej radości, rozkoszowania się, odczucie ciepła i prawdziwego zadom owienia się, gdzie 
rodzi się ruch ku św iatłu, które przyciąga człowieka, daje mu szczęścia i prawdziwe odczucie p rin ­
cipium  individuationis. Pragnienie drugiego zw'raca się przede w szystkim  ku twarzy kobiety, która 
o coś prosi i coś nakazuje, wzywając do kontaktu, zatroskania i odpowiedzialności.
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Le Vol avant la lum ière: certaines rem arques sur la phénom énologie de l ’cros chez
Em m anuel Lévinas
Ré s u mé
L ’article est une tentative de m ontrer du point de vue phénoménologique la relation avec l’Autre 
lequel n ’est pas l’objet d ’un désir (assouvissem ent d ’un besoin), mais l ’ob jec tif  d ’un désir 
m étaphysique „libre du m anque”, d ’un désir qui sera assouvi dans l ’infini. L ’Autre éveille mon souci 
et mon sens de responsabilité, il n 'e st pas une partie du „m oi”, mais une individualité totale et unique. 
Entre le „m oi” et l’Autre il existe une différence et une distance infinie q u ’il est impossible de 
dépasser, conceptualiser ou saisir intuitivem ent. On ne peut que la désirer. Le désir de l ’Autre est 
le désir de l ’infini qui se révèle au m om ent de la rencontre avec l ’Autre. Par conséquent, c ’est une 
expérience dans le dom aine éthique (Lévinas) qui précède l ’expérience ontologique (Heidegger), car 
le désir de l’infini apparaît comme plus originel que n ’importe quelle pensée „raisonnante” . La relation 
avec l ’Autre est un acte de la jo ie  gratuite, de la (ré jo u issan ce , le sentim ent de la chaleur et de la 
véritable fam iliarisation éveillant l’aspiration à la lumière, celle-ci attirant l ’homme, lui procurant 
le bonheur et le véritable sentiment d u principium  individuationis. Le désir de l’Autre s ’adresse avant 
tout au visage de la femme qui prie et ordonne en incitant au contact, au souci et à la responsabilité.
